CEO Power and Systemic in Banks: Role of Corporate Governance and Risk Governance Mechanisms

Abstract

The study investigates the impact of CEO Duality, CG (corporate governance) and RG (risk governance) mechanisms on the systemic risk along with investigating the moderating role of CG and RG on the relationship between CEO power and systemic risk by using a sample of 88 large listed commercial banks from 11 Asian countries namely Pakistan, China, India, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Jordan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Thailand and UAE. The study utilizes OLS (ordinary least square), random effect and fixed effect models and evidences the negative influence of CEO Power, CG and RG mechanisms on the systemic risk, only a few positively influencing the systemic risk such as CRO Presence and RMC (Risk management Committee) meetings. The findings show that a few CG and RG mechanisms significantly moderate the relationship between CEO power and systemic risk such as board size, RMC meetings, CRO (chief risk officer) presence. The influence of CEO power, CG and RG mechanisms is also investigated using the GMM approach to tackle endogeneity issues. The results of OLS, random effect, fixed effect are consistent with the GMM. Moreover, the moderation results of CG and RG mechanisms on the relationship between CEO power and systemic risk are also improved. CG mechanisms board size, board independence and board meetings significantly moderate the relationship between CEO power and systemic risk. RG mechanisms RMC presence, RMC size, CRO presence and CRO independence also significantly moderate the relationship between CEO power and systemic risk.